While the matter was in some doubt, the jurisdictional grant of the 1984 Amendments, when coupled with the procedural gyrations of § 157, appears to have satisfied the requirements of Marathon. First, one is entitled to assume that every district will generally refer "core proceedings" as defined in § 157(b)(2) to the bankruptcy courts, leaving it up to the bankruptcy judge to determine under § 157(b)(3) whether a proceeding is a core proceeding. Over the years the courts have had enormous difficulty with determinations of summary and plenary jurisdiction under the bankruptcy Act and the core proceeding and non-core proceeding distinction appears to have distinct similarities. However, after Marathon it was far from certain that the old summary jurisdiction concept was in fact constitutionally sound since the Supreme Court had never directly considered the issue.

More to the point, the procedure under § 157(c)(1) whereby the bankruptcy judge is permitted to hear a related or non-core proceeding and to enter proposed findings and conclusions which may be reviewed de novo by the district court if someone insists appears to be working although designed to evade rather than comply with the dictates of Marathon. In short, for better or for worse, the vast bulk of bankruptcy litigation will be tried by a bankruptcy judge who is not an Article III judge.

As noted above, an alternative that is present is the trial of a related or non-core proceeding by the bankruptcy court upon the consent of the parties under § 157(c)(2). If true consent, rather than consent implied from a failure to object in a timely manner, is what is contemplated, then § 157(c)(2) will be more an item of curiosity rather than a functioning procedure.